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Abstract
We consider the problem of property testing for differential privacy: with black-box access to
a purportedly private algorithm, can we verify its privacy guarantees? In particular, we show that
any privacy guarantee that can be efficiently verified is also efficiently breakable in the sense that
there exist two databases between which we can efficiently distinguish. We give lower bounds on
the query complexity of verifying pure differential privacy, approximate differential privacy, random
pure differential privacy, and random approximate differential privacy. We also give algorithmic upper
bounds. The lower bounds obtained in the work are infeasible for the scale of parameters that are
typically considered reasonable in the differential privacy literature, even when we suppose that the
verifier has access to an (untrusted) description of the algorithm. A central message of this work is
that verifying privacy requires compromise by either the verifier or the algorithm owner. Either the
verifier has to be satisfied with a weak privacy guarantee, or the algorithm owner has to compromise
on side information or access to the algorithm.
1 Introduction
Recently, differential privacy (DP) has gained traction outside of theoretical research as several com-
panies (Google, Apple, Microsoft, Census, etc.) have announced deployment of large-scale differen-
tially private mechanisms (Erlingsson et al., 2014, Apple, 2017, Abowd and Schmutte, 2017, Ding et al.,
2017). This use of DP, while exciting, might be construed as a marketing tool used to encourage privacy-
aware consumers to release more of their sensitive data to the company. In addition, the software behind
the deployment of DP is typically proprietary since it ostensibly provides commercial advantage. This
raises the question: with limited access to the software, can we verify the privacy guarantees of purport-
edly DP algorithms?
Suppose there exists some randomised algorithmA that is claimed to be Ξ- differentially private and
we are given query access to A. That is, the domain of A is the set of databases and we have the power
to choose a database D and obtain a (randomised) response A(D). How many queries are required to
verify the privacy guarantee? We formulate this problem in the property testing framework for pure DP,
approximate DP, random pure DP, and random approximate DP.
Definition 1 (Property testing with side information). A property testing algorithm with query com-
plexity q, proximity parameter α, privacy parameters Ξ and side information S, makes q queries to the
black-box and:
1. (Completeness) ACCEPTS with probability at least 2/3 if A is Ξ-private and S is accurate.
∗Email: amcm@umich.edu
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2. (Soundness) REJECTS with probability at least 2/3 if A is α-far from being Ξ-private.
In this early stage of commercial DP algorithms, approaches to transparency have been varied.
For some algorithms, like Google’s RAPPOR, a full description of the algorithm has been released
(Erlingsson et al., 2014). On the other hand, while Apple has released a white paper (Apple DP Team,
2017) and a patent (Thakurta et al., 2017), there are still many questions about their exact implementa-
tions. We focus on the two extreme settings: when we are given no information about the black-box
(except the domain and range), and the full information setting where we have an untrusted full de-
scription of the algorithm A. A similar formulation of DP in the property testing framework was first
introduced in Dixit et al. (2013), who consider testing for DP given oracle access to the probability den-
sity functions on outputs. Dixit et al. (2013) reduce this version of the problem to testing the Lipschitz
property of functions and make progress on this more general problem.
Both settings we consider, full information and no information, are subject to fundamental limitations.
We first show that verifying privacy is at least as difficult as breaking privacy, even in the full information
setting. That is, suppose r samples are sufficient to verify that an algorithm is Ξ-private. Then Theorem 6
implies that for every algorithm that is not Ξ-private, there exists some pair of neighbouring databases
D and D′ such that r samples from A(D) is enough to distinguish between D and D′. Differential
privacy is designed so that this latter problem requires a large number of samples. This connection has
the unfortunate implication that verifiability and privacy are directly at odds: if a privacy guarantee is
efficiently verifiable, then it mustn’t be a strong privacy guarantee.
For the remainder of this work we restrict to discrete distributions on [n]. Our upper and lower
bounds in each setting are contained in Table 1. We rule out sublinear verification of privacy in every
case except verifying approximate differential privacy in the full information setting. That is, for all
other definitions of privacy, the query complexity for property testing of privacy is Ω(n).
Each privacy notion we consider is a relaxation of pure differential privacy. Generally, the privacy
is relaxed in one of two ways: either privacy loss is allowed to occur on unlikely outputs, or privacy
loss is allowed to occur on unlikely inputs. The results in Theorem 8 and the lower bounds in Table 1
imply that for efficient verification, we need to relax in both directions. That is, random approximate DP
is the only efficiently verifiable privacy notion in the no information setting. Even then, we need about
1/δ2 queries per database to verify (ǫ, δ)-approximate differential privacy. Theorem 14 shows that
random approximate DP can be verified in (roughly) O(4n(1+e
2ǫ) log(1/γ)
γδ2 ) samples, where (roughly) δ
and γ are the probabilities of choosing a disclosive output or input, respectively. This means verification
is efficient if δ and γ are small but not too small. This may seem insufficient to those familiar with
DP, where common wisdom decrees that δ and γ should be small enough that this query complexity is
infeasibly large.
There have been several other relaxations of pure differential privacy proposed in the literature, chief
among them Rényi DP (Mironov, 2017) and concentrated DP (Dwork and Rothblum, 2016). These
relaxations find various ways to sacrifice privacy, with a view towards allowing a strictly broader class of
algorithms to be implemented. Similar to pure DP, Rényi and concentrated DP have the property that two
distributions P and Q can be close in TV distance while the pair (P,Q) has infinite privacy parameters.
Thus, many of the results for pure differential privacy in this work can be easily extended to Rényi and
concentrated DP. We leave these out of our discussion for brevity.
One might hope to obtain significantly lower query complexity if the property tester algorithm is
given side information, even if the side information is untrusted. We find that this is true for both
approximate DP and pure DP, if we allow the query complexity to depend on the side information. A
randomised algorithm A can be abstracted as a set of distributions {PD} where A(D) ∼ PD. We
obtain a sublinear verifier for approximate DP. For pure DP, we find the quantity that controls the query
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Table 1: Per Database Query complexity bounds for property testing of privacy
No Information Full information
pDP Unverifiable [Theorem 10] Ω
(
1
βα2
)
[Theorem 18]
O
(
lnn
α2β2
)
[Theorem 17]
aDP Ω(max{n1−o(1), 1
α2
}) [Theorem 12] O
(√
n
α2
)
[Theorem 16]
O( n
α2
) [Theorem 14]
complexity is
β = inf
D
min
i
PD(i),
the minimum value of the collection of distributions. If β is large then efficient verification is possible:
verifying that the pure differential privacy parameter is less than ǫ + α requires O( lnnα2β2 ) queries of
each database (Theorem 17). Note that this is not sublinear since β ≤ 1/n and if β = 0 then we
have no improvement on the no information setting. However, for reasonable β, this is a considerable
improvement on the no information lower bounds and may be efficient for reasonable n.
A central theme of this work is that verifying the privacy guarantees that corporations (or any entity
entrusted with private data) claim requires compromise by either the verifier or algorithm owner. If the
verifier is satisfied with only a weak privacy guarantee (random approximate DP with δ and γ small but
not extremely small), then they can achieve this with no side information from the algorithm owner. If the
company is willing to compromise by providing information about the algorithm up-front, then much
stronger privacy guarantees can be verified. Given this level of transparency, one might be tempted
to suggest that the company provide source code instead. While verifying privacy given source code
is an important and active area of research, there are many scenarios where the source code itself is
proprietary. We have already seen instances where companies have been willing to provide detailed
descriptions of their algorithms. In the full information case, we obtain our lowest sample complexity
algorithms, including a sublinear algorithm for verifying approximate differential privacy.
This paper proceeds as follows: we start by defining property testing for privacy in Section 2. We
then proceed to the main contributions of this work:
• Verifying privacy is as hard as breaking privacy (Section 3).
• In the no information setting, verifying pure differential privacy is impossible while there is a finite
query complexity property tester for approximate differential privacy (Section 5).
• If β > 0, then finite query complexity property testers exist for pure differential privacy in the full
information setting (Section 6).
• A sublinear property tester exists for approximate differential privacy in the full information set-
ting.
The main lower bounds and algorithmic upper bounds in this paper are summarized in Table 1.
2 Background and Problem Formulation
A database is a vectorD in Z|Ω| for some data universeΩ. That is, if ω ∈ Ω,Dω is the number of copies
of ω in the database. We call two databases D, D′ neighbouring if they differ on a single data point,
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that is ‖D − D′‖1 = 1. For a randomised algorithm A and database D, we use A(D) to denote the
output and PD to denote the distribution of A(D). We will often prefer to view an algorithm as simply
a collection of distributions {PD | D ∈ Z|Ω|}. We will only consider discrete distributions in this paper,
so PD is a discrete distribution on [n] = {1, · · · , n}. For a distribution P , P r represents r independent
copies of P .
For much of this paper we will consider algorithms that accept only two databases as input. We use
the notation A = (P0, P1) to denote such an algorithm that accepts only two databases 0 and 1 as input,
andA(0) ∼ P0 andA(1) ∼ P1. The databases 0 and 1 are assumed to be neighbouring.
The privacy notions we discuss will all center around the idea that PD and PD′ should be close for
neighbouring databases D and D′. As such, we will deal with many measures of closeness between
distributions. We collect these definitions for ease of reference.
Definition 2. Let P and Q be two distributions.
• (Max divergence)D∞(P,Q) = supE ln
P (E)
Q(E) .
• (δ-approximate max divergence)Dδ∞(P,Q) = supE s.t. P (E)≥δ ln
P (E)−δ
Q(E) .
• (KL divergence)DKL(P‖Q) =
∫
R P (x) ln
P (x)
Q(x)dx.
• (Total Variance (TV) distance) ‖P −Q‖TV = supE |P (E)−Q(E)|.
where the supE is the supremum over all events E in the outcome space.
2.1 Privacy Definitions
Pure differential privacy is the gold standard for privacy-preserving data analysis. However, it is a very
strong definition and as a result, many relaxations of it have gained traction as the work on differential
privacy evolves. These relaxations find various ways to sacrifice privacy, with a view towards allowing
a strictly broader class of algorithms to be implemented. Since these definitions are becoming standard,
we give only a cursory introduction in this section. An introduction can be found in Dwork and Roth
(2014) and more in depth surveys can be found in Vadhan (2016), Dwork (2008), Ji et al. (2014).
The idea is simple; suppose the adversary has narrowed the list of possible databases down to neigh-
bouring databases D and D′. Any output the adversary sees is almost equally as likely to have arisen
from PD or PD′ . Thus, the adversary gains almost no information that helps them distinguish between
D andD′.
Definition 3 (Data Distribution Independent Privacy Definitions). A randomised algorithmA is
• ǫ-pure differentially private (pDP) if supD,D′ D∞(PD, PD′) ≤ ǫ.
• (ǫ, δ)-approximate differentially private (aDP) if supD,D′ D
δ
∞(PD, PD′) ≤ ǫ.
where the supremums are over all pairs of neigbouring databasesD andD′.
Note that ǫ-pDP is exactly (ǫ, 0)-aDP. The parameter δ can be thought of as our probability of failing
to preserve privacy. To see this, suppose the distributions PD output 0 with probability 1 − δ, and
a unique identifier for the database D with probability δ. Then this algorithm is (0, δ)-DP. Thus, we
typically want δ to be small enough that we can almost guarantee that we will not observe this difference
in the distributions. In contrast, while it is desirable to have ǫ small, a larger ǫ still gives meaningful
guarantees (Dwork et al. (2011)). Typically one should think of δ as extremely small, δ ≈ 10−8, and ǫ
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Table 2: Privacy notions, parameters and metrics.
Privacy Notion Ξ ‖Ξ− Ξ′‖
pDP ǫ |ǫ− ǫ′|
aDP (ǫ, δ) |δǫ − δ′ǫ|
RpDP (ǫ, γ) min{|ǫ − ǫ′|, λ|γ − γ′|}
RaDP (ǫ, δ, γ) min{|δǫ − δ′ǫ|, λ|γ − γ
′|}
as quite small, ǫ ≈ 0.1. The larger β is, the more private the algorithm is. Unlike the other parameters
we will treat β as a fixed part of the definition, rather than a variable like ǫ.
Let D be a distribution on the data universe Ω. For a databaseD and datapoint z, let [D−1, z] denote
the neighbouring database where the first datapoint ofD is replaced by z.
Definition 4 (Data Distribution Dependent Privacy Definitons). An algorithmA is
• (ǫ, γ)-Random pure differentially private (RpDP) if P
(
D∞(PD, P[D−1,z]) ≤ ǫ
)
≥ 1− γ.
• (ǫ, δ, γ)-Randomapproximate differentially private (RADP) if P
(
Dδ∞(PD, P[D−1,z]) ≤ ǫ
)
≥ 1− γ.
where the probabilities in RpDP and RaDP are overD ∼ Dn, z ∼ D.
Similar to δ, γ represents the probability of catastrophic failure in privacy. Therefore, we require that
γ is small enough that this event is extremely unlikely to occur.
2.2 Problem Formulation
Our goal is to answer the question given these privacy parameters, is the algorithmA at least Ξ-private?
where Ξ is an appropriate privacy parameter. A property testing algorithm, which outputs ACCEPT
or REJECT, answers this question if it ACCEPTS whenever A is Ξ-private, and only ACCEPTS if the
algorithmA is close to beingΞ-private. A tester with side informationmay also REJECT simply because
the side information is inaccurate.
We say that A is α-far from being Ξ-private if minΞ′ ‖Ξ′ − Ξ‖ > α, where the minimum is over all
Ξ′ such that A is Ξ′-private. The metrics used for each form of privacy are contained in Table 2. We
introduce the scalar λ to penalise deviation in one parameter more than deviation in another parameter.
For example, it is much worse to mistake a (0, 0.1)-RpDP algorithm for (0, 0)-RpDP than it is to mistake
a (0.1, 0)-RpDP algorithm for (0, 0)-RpDP. We leave the question of how much worse as a parameter of
the problem. However, we give the general guideline that if we want an α error to be tolerable in both ǫ
and γ then λ ≈ ǫγ , which may be large, is an appropriate choice.
The formal definition of a property tester with side information was given in Definition 1. A no
information property tester is the special case when S = ∅. A full information property tester is the
special case when S = {QD} contains a distributionQD for each databaseD. We useQD to denote the
distribution on outputs presented in the side information and PD to denote the true distribution on outputs
of the algorithm being tested. For α > 0 and privacy parameter Ξ, a full information (FI) property tester
for this problem satisfies:
1. (Completeness) Accepts with probability at least 2/3 if the algorithm is Ξ-private and PD = QD
for all D.
2. (Soundness) Rejects with probability at least 2/3 if the algorithm is α-far from being Ξ-private.
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We only force the property tester to ACCEPT if the side information is exactly accurate (PD = QD).
It is an interesting question to consider a property tester that is forced to ACCEPT if the side-information
is close to accurate, for example in TV-distance. We do not consider this in this work as being close in
TV-distance does not imply closeness of privacy parameters.
For a databaseD, we will refer to the process of obtaining a sample from PD as querying the black-
box. It will usually be necessary to input each database into the black-boxmultiple times. We will usem
to denote the number of unique databases that are queries to the black-box and r to denote the number
of times each database is input. We will only consider algorithms where the number of samples from
PD for each input database is r, so our query complexity ismr for each algorithm. Our aim is verify the
privacy parameters using as few queries as possible.
2.3 Related Work
This work connects to two main bodies of literature. There are several works on verifying privacy with
different access models that share the same motivation as this work. In terms of techniques, our work is
most closely linked to recent work on property testing of distributions.
Testing DP in the property testing framework was first considered in Dixit et al. (2013). The access
model in this paper is different to ours but their goal is similar. Recent work by Ding et al. (2018) studies
privacy verification from a hypothesis testing perspective. They design a privacy verification algorithm
which aims to find violations of the privacy guarantee. Their algorithm provides promising experimental
results in non-adversarial settings (when the privacy guarantee is frequently violated), although they
provide no theoretical guarantees.
Several algorithms and tools have been proposed for formal verification of the DP guarantee of an al-
gorithm (Barthe et al., 2014, Roy et al., 2010, Reed and Pierce, 2010, Gaboardi et al., 2013, Tschantz et al.,
2011). Much of this work focuses on verifying privacy given access to a description of the algorithm.
There is a line of work (Barthe et al., 2014, Roy et al., 2010, Reed and Pierce, 2010, Gaboardi et al.,
2013, Tschantz et al., 2011, Barthe et al., 2012, 2013, McSherry, 2009) using logical arguments (type
systems, I/O automata, Hoare logic, etc.) to verify privacy. These tools are aimed at automatic (or sim-
plified) verification of privacy of source code. There is another related line of work where the central
problem is testing software for privacy leaks. This work focuses on blatant privacy leaks, such as a smart
phone application surreptitiously leaking a user’s email (Jung et al., 2008, Enck et al., 2010, Fan et al.,
2012).
Given sample access to two distributions P and Q and a distance measure d(·, ·), the question of
distinguishing between d(P,Q) ≤ a and d(P,Q) ≥ b is called tolerant property testing. This question
is closely related to the question of whether A = (P,Q) is private. There is a large body of work
exploring lower bounds and algorithmic upper bounds for tolerant testing using standard distances (TV,
KL, χ2, etc.) with both a = 0 and a > 0 (Daskalakis et al., 2018, Paninski, 2008, Batu et al., 2013,
Acharya et al., 2015, Valiant and Valiant, 2014). In our work, we draw most directly from the techniques
of Valiant (2011).
3 Lower Bounds via Distinguishability
We now turn to examining the fundamental limitations of property testing for privacy. We find that even
in the full information setting, the query complexity to verifying privacy is lower bounded by the number
of queries required to distinguish between two possible inputs. We expect the latter to increase with the
strength of the privacy guarantee.
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Definition 5. DatabasesD andD′ are r-distinguishable underA if there exists a testing algorithm such
that given a description ofA and x ∼ P rD′′ whereD
′′ ∈ {D,D′}, it accepts with probability at least 2/3
ifD′′ = D and rejects with probability at least 2/3 if D′′ = D′.
The following theorem says that the per database query complexity of a privacy property testing
algorithm is lower bounded by the minimal r such that two neighbouring databases are r-distinguishable
under A. Recall that we use the notation A = (P0, P1) to denote an algorithm that accepts only two
databases 0 and 1 as input, and A(0) ∼ P0 and A(1) ∼ P1. The databases 0 and 1 are assumed to be
neighbouring.
Theorem 6. Consider any privacy definition, privacy parameter Ξ, and let α > 0. Suppose there exists
a Ξ-privacy property tester with proximity parameter α and (per database) query complexity r. Let A
be an algorithm that is α-far from Ξ-private. If the privacy notion is
• pDP or aDP then there exists a pair of neighbouring databases that are r-distinguishable under
A.
• RpDP or RaDP and Ξ = (ǫ, δ, γ), then a randomly sampled pair of neighbouring databases has
probability at least γ + αλ of being r-distinguishable.
A major reason that DP has gained traction is that it is preserved even if the (randomised) algorithm
is repeated. That is, if k > 0 and (PD, PD′) is private, then (P kD, P
k
D′) is private with slightly worse
privacy parameters. Typically we want the privacy parameters to start small enough that k has to be
quite large before any pair of neighbouring databases can be distinguished between using the output. If
the algorithm is known and trusted then distinguishability may be possible with a feasible number of
samples, for example by mean estimation (Laplacian distribution, etc.). This is no longer necessarily
the case when make no assumptions on form of the distributions PD. In fact, many of our proofs in
the following sections proceed by finding two distribution P and Q such that (P,Q) has high privacy
parameters but it is still difficult to distinguish between P and Q (for example because they only differ
on a set with small measure). We consider this setting because we are considering an untrusted, possibly
adversarial, algorithm owner. In the future we would like to explore assumptions that can be placed on
the class of distributions that may lower the sample complexity of distinguishability.
Proof. We start with pDP or aDP and suppose such a Ξ-privacy property testing algorithm exists. Let
A be an algorithm that is α-far from Ξ-private. Since the privacy parameter is defined as a maximum
over all neighbouring databases, there exists a pair of databases D and D′ such that (PD, PD′) has the
same privacy parameter as A. We can design a tester algorithm that distinguishes betweenD andD′ as
follows: given input x ∼ P rD′′ , first sample y ∼ P
r
D. Then run the privacy property testing algorithm on
B = (PD′′ , PD) with sample (x, y). If D′′ = D then B is 0-DP, so the property tester will accept with
probability at least 2/3. IfD′′ = D′ then B is α-far from from Ξ-private so the property tester will reject
with probability at least 2/3.
Finally, suppose such a (ǫ, γ)-RpDP property testing algorithm exists. Let A be an algorithm that
is α-far from (ǫ, γ)-private so that, in particular, A is not (ǫ + α, γ + αλ )-RpDP. Thus, if we randomly
sample a pair of neighbouring databasesD andD′, with probability γ + αλ , (PD, PD′) is not ǫ+ α-pDP.
The remainder of the proof proceeds as above by noticing that the algorithm (PD, PD′) is α-far from
(ǫ, γ)-RpDP and (PD, PD) is (ǫ, γ)-RpDP. The proof of almost identical for RaDP.
4 Restriction to Two Distribution Setting
Differential privacy is an inherently local property. That is, verifying thatA is Ξ-private means verifying
that (PD, PD′) is Ξ-private, either always or with high probability, for pairs of neighbouring databases
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Algorithm 1 Random-privacy Property Tester
Input: A two distribution property tester T , α, γ > 0, a data distribution D
for i = 1 : m do
Sample (D,D′) neighbours from D.
for j = 1 : log(2λ/α) do
xij = 1 if T (PD, PD′) REJECTS
end for
xi = ⌊
1
2 +
1
log(2λ/α)
∑log(2λ/α)
j=1 xij⌋
end for
y = 1m
∑m
i=1 xi
if y ≤ γ + αλ then
Output: ACCEPT
else
Output: REJECT
end if
D and D′. We refer to the problem of determining whether a pair of distributions (P0, P1) satisfies
Ξ-privacy as the two database setting. We argue in this section that the hard part of privacy property
testing is the two database setting. For this reason, from Section 5 onwards, we only consider the two
database setting. Recall that we use the notation A = (P0, P1) to denote an algorithm that accepts only
two databases 0 and 1 as input, and A(0) ∼ P0 and A(1) ∼ P1. The databases 0 and 1 are assumed to
be neighbouring.
An algorithm is non-adaptive if it choosesm pairs of distributions and queries the blackbox with each
database r times. It does not choose its queries adaptively. The following is a non-adaptive algorithm
for converting a tester in the two database setting to a random privacy setting.
Theorem 7 (Conversion to random privacy tester). If there exists a Ξ-privacy property tester for the two
database setting with query complexity r per database and proximity parameter α, then there exists a
privacy property tester for (Ξ, γ)-random privacy with proximity parameter 2α and query complexity
O
(
r log
(
2λ
α
)
(α/λ+ γ)2 + α/λ
(α/λ)2
)
.
Proof. The conversion is given in Algorithm 1. We first prove completeness. Suppose A is (γ,Ξ)-
random private. Let
S = {(D,D′) | D,D′ are neighbours and (PD, PD′) is Ξ-private}
so 1 − γ ≤ P(S) ≤ 1. Our goal is to estimate P(S) using the empirical estimate given by 1m
∑m
i=1 xi.
We perform the property tester log(λ/α) times on the pair (PD, PD′) to reduce the failure probability
from 1/3 to α2λ so
E[xi] = P(xi = 1 | (D,D
′) ∈ S)P(S) + P(xi = 1 | (D,D′) /∈ S)P(Sc) ≤
α
2λ
+ γ.
Now,
P
(
y ≥ γ +
α
λ
)
≤ P
(
y − E[y] ≥
α
2λ
)
≤ e
−m(α/λ)2
2( α
2λ
+γ)2+2(α/λ) ≤
1
3
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where the first inequality follows from Bernstein’s inequality (Sridharan, 2018). Therefore, Algorithm 1
ACCEPTS with probability at least 2/3. To prove soundness supposeA is 2α-far from Ξ-private. Let
S = {(D,D′) | D,D′ are neighbours and (PD, PD′) is 2α-far from Ξ-private}
so 1 ≥ P(S) ≥ γ + 2α/λ. Then E[xi] ≥
(
1− α2λ
) (
γ + 2αλ
)
≥ γ + αλ +
α
2λ . Therefore as above,
P
(
y ≤ γ +
α
λ
)
≤ P
(
y − E[y] ≤
−α
2λ
)
≤
1
3
.
So, Algorithm 1 REJECTS with probability at least 2/3.
Notice that if γ ≈ αλ then the query complexity is approximately r log(
λ
α )
λ
α ≈
r log( 1γ )
γ . One
shortcoming of the conversion algorithm in Theorem 7 is that we need to know the data distribution
D. We can relax to an approximation D′ that is close in TV-distance, but it is not difficult to see that
‖D − D′‖1 ≤ αλ is necessary.
Theorem 8 (Lower bound). Let γ, α > 0. Let r be a lower bound on the query complexity in the two
distribution settting. If γ+ αλ is sufficiently small then any non-adaptive (Ξ, γ)-random privacy property
tester with proximity parameter α has query complexity Ω(max{r, λα}).
We conjecture that the lower bound is actually Ω(r λα ). If this is true then Theorem 7 gives an almost
optimal conversion from the two database setting to the random setting.
Proof. A random privacy property tester naturally induces a property tester in the two distribution setting
(P,Q) by setting PD = P for half the databases and PD = Q for the other half. Then {PD} is (Ξ, γ)-
random private if (P,Q) is Ξ and α-far if (P,Q) is α-far. Therefore, the random privacy tester must use
at least as many queries as a privacy tester in the two database setting.
Suppose (P,Q) is α-far from Ξ-private and the data universe is uniformly distributed. If γ + αλ is
small enough then there exists a pair of nested subsets S′ ⊂ S ⊂ ZΩ such that
P((S × Sc) ∩ {(D,D′) | D,D′ neighbours }) = γ +
α
λ
and
P((S′ × S′c) ∩ {(D,D′) | D,D′ neighbours }) = γ.
Define PD = P ifD ∈ S, PD = Q ifD ∈ Sc,QD = P ifD ∈ S′ andQD = Q ifD ∈ S′. Then {PD}
is (Ξ, γ)-random private and {QD} is α-far from (Ξ, γ)-random private.
Recall that a non-adaptive property testing algorithm can query by randomly sampling a pair of
neighbours D,D′, and then sampling PD × PD′ . If N is the normalisation factor, the distributions
1
N
∑
(D,D′) neighbours PD × PD′ and
1
N
∑
(D,D′) neighboursQD ×QD′ have total variation distance 2‖P −
Q‖TV P((S\S′) × Sc) ∩ {(D,D′) | D,D′ neighbours }) ≤ αλ . Therefore, it takes at least
λ
α queries to
distinguish between {PD} and {QD}.
5 No Information Setting
We first show that no privacy property tester with finite query complexity exists for pDP. We then analyse
a finite query complexity privacy property tester for aDP, as well query complexity lower bounds. For
the remainder of this work we consider the two databases setting, where each algorithm A = (P0, P1)
accepts only two databases, 0 and 1, as input andA(0) ∼ P0 andA(1) = P1. The databases 0 and 1 are
assumed to be neighbouring.
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5.1 Unverifiability
The impossibility of testing pDP arises from the fact that very low probability events can cause the
privacy parameters to increase arbitrarily. In each case we can design distributions P and Q that are
close in TV-distance but for which the algorithm (P,Q) has arbitrarily large privacy parameters. This
intuition allows us to use a corollary of Le Cam’s inequality (Corollary 9) to prove our impossibility
results.
Lemma 9. For any privacy definition, let α be the proximity parameter andΞ be the privacy parameters.
SupposeA = (P0, P1) and B = (Q0, Q1) are algorithms such thatA is Ξ-DP and B is α-far from being
Ξ-DP. Then, any privacy property testing algorithm with QC 2r must satisfy
‖(P r0 × P
r
1 )− (Q
r
0 ×Q
r
1)‖TV ≥
1
3
Theorem 10 (pDP lower bound). Let α > 0 and ǫ > 0. No ǫ-pDP property tester with proximity
parameter α has finite query complexity.
Proof. Let r be the query complexity of any pDP property tester. Let A > 2ǫ+ α. Our goal is to prove
that r > θ(eA/A). If this is true for all A, the query complexity cannot be finite.
Consider algorithms,A = (P0, P1) and B = (Q0, Q1) where
P0 = Q0 = e
−A−ǫχψ + (1 − e−A−ǫ)χω,
P1 = e
−Aχψ + (1 − e−A)χω and Q1 = e−2Aχψ + (1− e−2A)χω.
Then A is ǫ-pDP and B is α-far from ǫ-pDP. Now, by Pinsker’s inequality,
‖(P r0 , P
r
1 ), (Q
r
0, Q
r
1)‖TV ≤
√
r
2
√
DKL(P0|Q0).
Therefore, by Lemma 9,
r ≥
2
9
1
DKL(P0|Q0)
=
2
9
1
e−A log(eA) + (1− e−A) log
(
1−e−A
1−e−2A
) = θ
(
eA
A
)
.
We designed two distributions that are equal on a large probability set but for which the ratio P0(x)Q0(x)
blows-up on a set with small probability. In Section 6 we will see that testing pure DP becomes possible
if we make assumptions on the algorithm A. The assumption we need will ensure that P0(x)Q0(x) is upper
bounded.
5.2 Property Testing for aDP in the No Information Setting
Fortunately, the situation is less dire for verifying aDP. Finite query complexity property testers do exist
for aDP, although their query complexity can be very large. In the previous section, we relied on the
fact that two distributions P and Q can be close in TV-distance while (P,Q) has unbounded privacy
parameters. In this section, we first show this is not true for aDP, which sets it apart from the other
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privacy notions. We then prove that the query complexity is Ω
(
max
{
n1−o(1), 1α2
})
, and there exists an
algorithm that uses O(4n(1+e
2ǫ)
α2 ) queries per database. Define
δAǫ ≥ max
D,D′neighbours
max
E
PD(E)− e
ǫPD′(E). (1)
An algorithm is (ǫ, δ)-aDP if and only if δ > δAǫ . The following lemma shows the relationship between
the aDP parameters and TV-distance.
Lemma 11. Let A = (P0, P1) and suppose A is (ǫ, δ)-aDP and α > 0. If B = (Q0, Q1) and
1. ‖P0 −Q0‖TV ≤ α
2. ‖P1 −Q1‖TV ≤ α,
then B is (ǫ, δ+(1+eǫ)α)−aDP. Furthermore, if α ≤ 1−δ1+eǫ then this bound is tight. That is, if δ
A
ǫ > 0,
then there exists an algorithm B = (Q0, Q1) such that conditions (1) and (2) hold but B is α-far from
(ǫ, δAǫ ).
Proof. For any event E,
Q0(E) ≤ P0(E) + α ≤ e
ǫP1(E) + δA + α ≤ eǫQ1(E) + eǫα+ α+ δA.
Similarly,Q1(E) ≤ eǫQ0(E) + eǫα+ α+ δA.
Conversely, let A = (P0, P1) and suppose δAǫ > 0. There must exist an event E such that P0(E) =
eǫP1(E) + δ
A
ǫ . The condition on α can rewritten as 1 − α ≥ e
ǫα + δ so we must have that either
P0(E) ≤ 1− α or P1(E) ≥ α.
First, suppose that P0(E) ≤ 1− α. Then there exists a distributionQ0 such that
‖Q0 − P0‖TV = α and Q0(E) = P0(E) + α. If we let Q1 = P1 then Q0(E) = eǫQ1(E) + α + δAǫ ,
which implies B = (Q0, Q1) is α-far from (ǫ, δAǫ )-aDP.
Finally, suppose P1(E) ≥ α. Then there exists a distributionQ1 such that
‖Q1 − P1‖TV = α and Q1(E) = P1(E) − α. Letting Q0 = P0, again B = (Q0, Q1) is α-far from
(ǫ, δAǫ )-aDP.
Theorem 12 (Lower bound). Let α, ǫ, δ > 0 and suppose eǫ/2 + δ + α < 1. Any (ǫ, δ)-aDP property
tester with proximity parameter α has query complexity
r ≥ max
{
n1−o(1),
1
α2
}
.
The proof of the 1/α2 component of the lower bound relies on Lemma 9 in a similar way to Theorem
10. The proof of the n1−o(1) lower bound borrows a technique from Valiant (2011). The lemma uses the
fact that if two distributions only differ on elements of [n] with low probability, then many samples are
needed to distinguish between them.
A property π of a distribution is a function π : ZΩ → R. It is called symmetric if for all permutations
σ and distributions p we have π(p) = π(p ◦ σ). It is (α, β)-weakly-continuous if for all distributions p+
and p− satisfying ‖p+ − p−‖TV ≤ β we have |π(p+)− π(p−)| ≤ α. The following lemma will be used
in the proof of Theorem 12.
Lemma 13. Valiant (2011) Given a symmetric property π on distributions on [n] that is (α, β)-weakly-
continuous and two distributions, p+, p− that are identical for any index occurring with probability at
least 1/k in either distribution but where π(p+) > b and π(p−) < a, then no tester can distinguish
between π > b− ǫ and π < q + ǫ in k · β
1000·24√log n samples.
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For aDP, our property is π((P,Q)) = δǫ, which is ((1 + eǫ)α, α)-weakly-continuous. We can now
prove our lower bound.
Proof of Theorem 12. Let P0 = Q0 be the uniform distribution on {ψ, ω}. Let
P1 =
(
eǫ
2
+ δ
)
χψ +
(
1−
eǫ
2
− δ
)
χω
and
Q1 =
(
eǫ
2
+ δ + α
)
χψ +
(
1−
eǫ
2
− δ − α
)
χω.
Then, (P0, P1) is (ǫ, δ)-aDP and (Q0, Q1) is α-far from (ǫ, δ)-aDP. Now,
DKL(P1|Q1) =
(
eǫ
2
+ δ + α
)
ln
(
1 +
α
eǫ
2 + δ
)
+
(
eǫ
2
− δ − α
)
ln
(
1−
α
eǫ
2 − δ
)
. α2.
By the same argument as Theorem 10 we have r = Ω
(
1
α2
)
.
Suppose [n] is a disjoint union of the sets R1, R2 and R3, all of which have cardinality n/3. Let
a = 2δ+α3 , b = 2a, η =
δ−α
3 so a+ η = δ and b − η = δ + α. Let
P1 = P0 = Q0 =
3a
n
χR1 +
3(1− a)
n
χR2
Q1 =
3(1− a)
n
χR2 +
3a
n
χR3 .
Now, for (P0, P1), δǫ ≤ a and for (Q0, Q1), δǫ ≥ 2a = b. Since the distributions agree on any index with
probability greater than 3an , Lemma 13 implies that no tester can distinguish between δǫ ≥ b−η = δ+α
and δǫ ≤ a+ η = δ with less than n3a (1 + e
ǫ)η = 3n(δ−α)2δ+α = Ω(n) samples.
At first glance, Theorem 12 doesn’t look too bad. We should expect the sample complexity to scale
like 1/α2 since we need to have enough samples to detect the bad events. Our concern is the size of α. If
we would like α to be the same order as δ, then our query complexity must scale as 1δ2 . As we typically
require δ to be extremely small (i.e. δ ≈ 10−8), 1δ may be infeasibly large. If we are willing to accept
somewhat larger δ, then 1δ2 may be reasonable.
We now turn our attention to Algorithm 2, a simple algorithm for testing aDP with query complexity
O(4n(1+e
2ǫ)
α2 ). Its sample complexity matches the lower bound in Theorem 12 in α when n is held
constant and in n when α is held constant. We are going to use a trick called Poissonisation to simplify
the proof of soundness and completeness, as in Batu et al. (2013). Suppose that, rather than taking r
samples from P , the algorithm first samples r1 from a Poisson distribution with parameter λ = r and
then takes r1 samples from P . Let Xi be the random variable corresponding to the number of times
the element i ∈ [n] appears in the sample from P . Then Xi is distributed identically to the Poisson
distribution with parameter λ = pir and all theXi’s are mutually independent. Similarly, we sample r2
from a Poisson distribution with parameter r and then take r2 samples fromQ. Let Yi be the the number
of times i appears in the sample fromQ, so Yi is Poisson with λ = qir and the Yi are independent.
Theorem 14 (Upper bound). Let ǫ, δ, α > 0. Algorithm 2 is a (ǫ, δ)-aDP property tester with proximity
parameter 2α and sample complexity O(4n(1+e
2ǫ)
α2 ).
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Algorithm 2 aDP Property Tester
Input: Universe size n, ǫ, δ, α > 0
λ = max{ 4n(1+e
2ǫ)
α2 ,
12(1+e2ǫ)
α2 }
Sample r ∼Poi(λ)
SampleD0 ∼ P r,D1 ∼ Qr
for i ∈ [m] do
xi = number of i’s in D0
yi = number of i’s inD1
zi =
1
r (xi − e
ǫyi)
end for
z =
∑r
i=1max{0, zi}
if z < δ + α then
Output: ACCEPT
else
Output: REJECT
end if
Proof. Let pi = P (i) and qi = Q(i). Let Zi = 1r (Xi − e
ǫYi) so E[Zi] = pi − eǫqi and Var(Zi) ≤
pi+e
2ǫqi
r . Note also that (P,Q) is (ǫ, δ)-DP if∆ :=
∑n
i=1max{0,E[Zi]} ≤ δ. First note that E[Z] ≥ ∆.
If E[Zi] ≤ 0 then
E[max{0, Zi}] =
∫ ∞
0
P(max{0, Zi} > x)dx
=
∫ ∞
0
P(Zi > x)dx
≤
∫ ∞
0
P(Zi − E[Zi] > x− E[Zi])dx
≤
∫ ∞
0
min{1,
V arZi
(x− E[Zi])2
}dx
=
∫ √V arZi+E[Zi]
0
1dx+
∫ ∞
√
V arZi+E[Zi]
V arZi
(x− E[Zi])2
dx
=
√
V arZi + E[Zi] +
√
V arZi
≤
√
pi + e2ǫqi
r
If E[Zi] > 0 then E[max{0, Xi}] ≤ E[Zi] +
√
pi+e2ǫqi
r = pi − e
ǫqi +
√
pi+e2ǫqi
r . Therefore,
E[Z] ≤ ∆+
n∑
i=1
√
pi + e2ǫqi
r
≤ ∆+
√
n
r
(1 + e2ǫ)
13
Now, let Z ′i be an independent copy of Zi then
V ar[max{0, Zi}] =
1
2
E[(max{0, Zi} −max{0, Z
′
i})
2]
=
∫ ∞
0
P((max{0, Zi} −max{0, Z
′
i})
2 ≥ x)dx
≤
∫ ∞
0
P((Zi − Z
′
i)
2 ≥ x)dx
= V arZi =
pi + e
2ǫqi
r
.
So V arZ ≤ 1+e
2ǫ
r . Therefore,
P(|Z −∆| ≥ α) ≤ P(|Z − E[Z]|+ |E[Z]−∆| ≥ α)
≤ P(|Z − E[Z]| ≥ α−
√
n
r
(1 + e2ǫ))
≤
V arZ
(α−
√
n
r (1 + e
2ǫ))2
≤
1 + e2ǫ
r(α −
√
n
r (1 + e
2ǫ))2
,
which is less than 1/3 if r ≥ max{ 4n(1+e
2ǫ)2
α2 ,
12(1+e2ǫ)
α2 }.
6 Full Information (FI) Setting
The situation is substantially rosier if we have side-information. Although there are some realistic sce-
narios where one may have trusted side-information, we will focus on untrusted side-information. In
particular, we allow our property tester to REJECT simply because the provided side-information is in-
accurate. We will see that the untrusted side-information can still be useful since verifying information
is often easier than estimating it.
The usefulness of side-information in property testing is informally lower bounded by how easy it is
to generate the same information, and how much the information tells us about the property. Proposition
15 below demonstrates this idea when the side information is the means of the distributions. The means
of the distributions (P0, P1) are efficient to estimate, but do not tell us very much about whether or
not the privacy guarantee is satisfied. If A is an unbiased estimate for a function f , then the following
proposition states that knowing the function the black-box is computing does not help in verifying pDP.
Proposition 15. Let α, ǫ > 0 and suppose the side information is (a, b), which are purported to be the
means of P0 and P1. If there exists a Ξ-private algorithm (P0, P1) supported on [n− 1] with E(P0) = a
and E(P1) = b, then no ǫ-pDP property tester with side information (a, b) and proximity parameter α
has finite query complexity.
The requirement that a Ξ-private algorithm with the right side information exists is necessary. If
no such algorithm exists, then the tester should always REJECT and requires no queries. Under the
assumption that such an algorithm exists, it is reasonable to assume that there exists an algorithm with
slightly smaller support.
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Algorithm 3 aDP FI Property Tester
Input: Universe size n, ǫ, δ, α > 0, (Q0, Q1) and identify tester T with sample complexity r
if (Q0, Q1) is not (ǫ, δ)-aDP then
Output: REJECT
else
if T (Q0, x ∼ P r0 ) = REJECT or T (Q1, x ∼ P
r
1 ) = REJECT then
Output: REJECT
else
Output: ACCEPT
end if
end if
Proof. Let A > 0 and A = (P0, P1) be the algorithm promised. That is, (P0, P1) is Ξ-private and
supported on [n − 1]. Let Q0 = (1 − e−A)P0 + e−Aχn and Q1 = P1 so (Q0, Q1) is α-far from pDP.
Now, ‖P0 × P1 −Q0 ×Q1‖TV ≤ e−A so it requires eA → ∞ samples to distinguish between the two
distributions.
For the remainder of the paper we focus on what we call the full information setting: we are given
sample access toA and a distributionQD for each databaseD. This case may seem optimistic, however
we will find that the lower bounds obtained are still very large. The lower bounds in this optimistic
setting also hold for more realistic setting when the verifier has less information. In contrast to the mean,
this side information is very informative about the privacy of the algorithm. It is also difficult to generate
based on samples. We can estimate it using Θ( nα2 ) (Chan et al., 2014a) queries of each database, where
α is the accuracy in TV-distance. However, we already know that the only privacy notion for which an
estimate is sufficient is aDP.
In Algorithm 3 we use an identity tester rather than density estimation to obtain a lower sample
complexity. An identity tester is a property tester T that takes as input a description of the discrete
distributionP andm samples from a distributionQ. If P = Q then the tester ACCEPTS with probability
at least 2/3 and if ‖P − Q‖TV ≥ α then the tester REJECTS with probability at least 2/3. It is also
known that testing identity to a known distribution requires asymptotically less samples than estimating
an unknown distribution.
Proposition 16. There exists a identity tester T such that Algorithm 3 is a (ǫ, δ)-aDP FI property tester
with query complexity O
(√
n
α2
)
and proximity parameter α.
This is our first, and only, sublinear query complexity property tester for privacy. Since closeness
in TV-distance implies closeness in aDP, we only need to check that the true distributions are close to
(Q0, Q1) and that (Q0, Q1) is (ǫ, δ)-aDP. The difficult part is testing closeness of the distributions, for
which we borrow from Chan et al. (2014b).
Proof. Chan et al. (2014b) proved that there exists a property tester T that takes as input a description
of the discrete distribution P and O(
√
n
α2 ) samples from an distribution Q. If P = Q then the tester
ACCEPTS with probability at least 2/3 and if ‖P −Q‖TV ≥ α then the tester REJECTS with probability
at least 2/3. If we increase the sample complexity of the tester T by a constant factor then we can replace
2/3 with
√
2/3.
To prove completeness, suppose (P0, P1) = (Q0, Q1) and (Q0, Q1) is (ǫ, δ)-aDP. Since T AC-
CEPTS on both pairs (Q0, P0) and (Q1, P1) with probability at least
√
2/3, it ACCEPTS both with
probability at least 2/3. To prove soundness, suppose (P0, P1) is
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(1 + eǫ)α-far from (ǫ, δ)-aDP. Assume (Q0, Q1) is (ǫ, δ)-aDP because otherwise the tester REJECTS.
It must be the case that either ‖Q0 − P0‖TV ≥ α or ‖Q1 − P1‖TV ≥ α because otherwise (P0, P1)
would be (ǫ, (1 + eǫ)α)-aDP by Lemma 11. Thus, with probability at least 2/3 either T (Q0, x ∼ P0) =
REJECT or T (Q1, x ∼ P1) = REJECT.
Next, we show that for pDP, the side information allows us to obtain a finite query complexity prop-
erty tester. The side-information gives us an easy way to switch from a worst-case analysis to input
specific upper bounds. We argue that
β = min
E
min
D
PD(E),
where the first min is over events E and the second is over databases D, is the crucial quantity in
understanding verifiability in the full information setting.
The lower bound proofs in the previous section all proceeded by finding two algorithms A and B
that were close in TV-distance but had very different privacy parameters. The algorithms we chose all
had one feature in common: the distributions PD contained very low probability events. This property
allowed us to drive the denominator of QD(E)PD(E) to 0, and hence the privacy loss to ∞, while remaining
close in TV-distance. This method works equally well in the full-information setting if low probability
events exist in the distributionsQD.
If the distribution QD does not have low probability events, then any distributions close to PD must
have bounded privacy parameters. To see this, suppose (Q0, Q1) = (U,U) where U is the uniform
distribution U on {ψ, ω}. We can establish in approximately 1α2 samples whether or not P0 and P1 are
both within TV-distance α of uniform. If not, then we REJECT. If so, then the worst case for privacy is
P0 = (1/2 − α)χψ + (1/2 + α)χω and P1 = (1/2 + α)χψ + (1/2− α)χω . However, the increase in
the pDP parameter from (Q0, Q1) to (P0, P1) is bounded by ln
1/2+α
1/2−α ≈ α.
Algorithm 4 is a full information property tester for pDP. Note that this algorithm is not sublinear in
n since β < 1n .
Theorem 17 (pDP upper bound). Let ǫ > 0 and α > 0. Algorithm 4 is an ǫ-aDP FI property tester with
proximity parameter 10α and query complexity O
(
lnn
α2β2
)
.
Proof. We first show completeness. Suppose (P0, P1) = (Q0, Q1) andA is ǫ-pDP. By the multiplicative
Hoeffding’s inequality,
P
(
xi
(P0)i
≥ eα or
(P0)i
xi
≥ eα
)
≤ e−2r(e
α−1)2β2 + e−2r(1−e
−α)2β2 .
Therefore,
P
(
∃i s.t.
xi
(P0)i
≥ eα or
(P0)i
xi
≥ eα
)
≤ n(e−2r(e
α−1)2β2 + e−2r(1−e
−α)2β2) ≤
1
6
.
Thus with probability 2/3 we have for all i, e−α ≤ xi(P0)i ≤ e
α and e−α ≤ yi(P1)i ≤ e
α and so
xi
yi
=
xi
(P0)i
(P0)i
(P1)i
(P1)i
yi
≤ eαeǫeα.
This implies ǫˆ ≤ ǫ+ 2α so we ACCEPT.
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Algorithm 4 pDP FI Property Tester
Input: Universe size n, ǫ, α > 0, (Q0, Q1)
λ = lnnα2β2
Sample r ∼Poi(λ)
SampleD0 ∼ P r0 ,D1 ∼ P
r
1
for i ∈ [m] do
xi = number of i’s in D0
yi = number of i’s inD1
end for
ǫˆ = supimax{ln
xi
yi
, ln yixi }
if ǫˆ > ǫ+ 2α then
Output: REJECT
else
if ∀i e−α ≤ xi(Q0)i ≤ e
α and e−α ≤ yi(Q1)i ≤ e
α then
Output: ACCEPT
else
Output: REJECT
end if
end if
For soundness, we show that the ACCEPT conditions imply that (P0, P1)must be at least (ǫ + 10α)-
pDP. The condition e−α ≤ xi(Q0)i ≤ e
α implies |xi − (Q0)i| ≤ max{(eα − 1)(Q0)i, (1 − e−α)(Q0)i}.
Also, by the additive Hoeffding’s inequality
P
(
∃i s.t. |xi − (P0)i| ≥ (Q0)imax{(e
α − 1), (1− e−α)}
)
≤ nmin{e−r(e
α−1)2β2 , e−r(1−e
−α)2β2}
≤
1
6
.
Therefore, with probability 2/3,
|(P0)i − (Q0)i| ≤ (Q0)imax{2(e
α − 1), 2(1− e−α)} ≤ 2α(Q0)i
for sufficiently small α. This impliesmax{ (P0)i(Q0)i ,
(Q0)i
(P0)i
} ≤ e4α. Similarly,
max{
(P1)i
(Q1)i
,
(Q1)i
(P1)i
} ≤ e4α.
Since ǫˆ ≤ ǫ + 2α we have
(P0)i
(P1)i
=
(P0)i
(Q0)i
(Q0)i
xi
xi
yi
yi
Q1)i
(Q1)i
(P1)i
≤ e4α+α+ǫ+2α+α+4α.
We now turn to lower bounding the query complexity of aDP testing in the FI setting. The sample
complexity is tight in α but deviates by a factor of β.
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Theorem 18 (pDP lower bound). Let α > 0 and ln 2 > ǫ > 0. Given side information (Q0, Q1), any
ǫ-pDP property tester with proximity parameter α has query complexity Ω
(
1
βα2
)
.
Proof. Let ψ, ω, φ ∈ [n] and notice that β < 1/2 provided n > 2. To prove the lower bound let
Q0 = βχψ + βχω + (1− 2β)χφ andQ1 = e
ǫβχψ + (2 − e
ǫ)βχω + (1 − 2β)χφ
be the side-information. Then (Q0, Q1) is ǫ-pDP. Let
P0 = e
−αβχψ + (2− e−α)βχω + (1− 2β)χφ and P1 = Q1
so (P0, P1) is α-far from ǫ-pDP. Now,
DKL(P0|Q0) = β ln
β
e−αβ
+ β ln
β
(2− e−α)β
= βα+ β ln
(
1−
1− e−α
2− e−α
)
≤ βα− βα+ βα2 = βα2.
As in Theorem 10, we must have
r ≥
2
9
1
DKL(P0|Q0)
= Ω
(
1
βα2
)
.
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